Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences, meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy and meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, the second one, that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain\u2019s neural activity. From this comparison it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda

Coping with stereotype threat: Denial as an impression management strategy

Four experiments tested the hypothesis that people who are concerned with impression management cope with stereotype threat through denial. Consistent with this hypothesis, temporary employees threatened by a stereotype of incompetence (Study 1) and hostel-dwelling older adults (Study 2) were more likely to deny incompetence if they were high in impression management. African Americans (Study 3) showed a similar pattern of denying cognitive incompetence, which emerged primarily when they were interviewed by a White experimenter and had attended a predominantly Black high school. In Study 4, White students who expected to take an IQ test and were threatened by a stereotype of being less intelligent than Asians were more likely to deny that intelligence is important if they were high in impression management.This research was supported by Grant R01 17842 from the National Institute of Aging and by grants from the Australian Research Council

On the Nature of Everyday Prospection: A Review and Theoretical Integration of Research on Mind-Wandering, Future Thinking, and Prospective Memory

© 2020 The Authors. The final, definitive version of this paper has been published by Sage Publications Ltd. All rights reserved. It is available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268020918843The ability to imagine and simulate events that may happen in the future has been studied in several related but independent research areas (e.g., episodic future thinking, mind-wandering, prospective memory), with a newly emerging field of involuntary future thinking focusing primarily on the spontaneous occurrence of such thoughts. In this article, we review evidence from these diverse fields to address important questions about why do people think about the future, what are the typical and most frequent contents of such thoughts, and how do these thoughts occur (are they spontaneous or constructed deliberately). Results of the literature review provide support for the pragmatic theory of prospection, by showing that when people engage in prospective thought naturally, without being explicitly instructed to do so, they predominantly think about their upcoming tasks and planned activities instead of simulating plausible but novel hypothetical scenarios. Moreover, prospective thoughts are more often spontaneous than deliberate and effortful, and their occurrence seems to increase the likelihood of planned activities being completed in the future. The findings are discussed in the context of a new “pragmatic dual process account” of future thinking, and new avenues for future research on prospection are outlined.Peer reviewe

Mind-Wandering as a Natural Kind : A Family-Resemblances View

As empirical research on mind-wandering accelerates, we draw attention to an emerging trend in how mind-wandering is conceptualized. Previously articulated definitions of mind-wandering differ from each other in important ways, yet they also maintain overlapping characteristics. This conceptual structure suggests that mind-wandering is best considered from a family-resemblances perspective, which entails treating it as a graded, heterogeneous construct and clearly measuring and describing the specific aspect(s) of mind-wandering that researchers are investigating. We believe that adopting this family-resemblances approach will increase conceptual and methodological connections among related phenomena in the mind-wandering family and encourage a more nuanced and precise understanding of the many varieties of mind-wandering

Performance breakdown effects dissociate from error detection effects in typing

Mistakes in skilled performance are often observed to be slower than correct actions. This error slowing has been associated with cognitive control processes involved in performance monitoring and error detection. A limited literature on skilled actions, however, suggests that preerror actions may also be slower than accurate actions. This contrasts with findings from unskilled, discrete trial tasks, where preerror performance is usually faster than accurate performance. We tested 3 predictions about error-related behavioural changes in continuous typing performance. We asked participants to type 100 sentences without visual feedback. We found that (a) performance before errors was no different in speed than that before correct key-presses, (b) error and posterror key-presses were slower than matched correct key-presses, and (c) errors were preceded by greater variability in speed than were matched correct key-presses. Our results suggest that errors are preceded by a behavioural signature, which may indicate breakdown of fluid cognition, and that the effects of error detection on performance (error and posterror slowing) can be dissociated from breakdown effects (preerror increase in variability). © 2013 © 2013 The Experimental Psychology Society

Posterior Beta and Anterior Gamma Oscillations Predict Cognitive Insight

Pioneering neuroimaging studies on insight have revealed neural correlates of the emotional “Aha!” component of the insight process, but neural substrates of the cognitive component, such as problem restructuring (a key to transformative reasoning), remain a mystery. Here, multivariate electroencephalogram signals were recorded from human participants while they solved verbal puzzles that could create a small-scale experience of cognitive insight. Individuals responded as soon as they reached a solution and provided a rating of subjective insight. For unsolved puzzles, hints were provided after 60 to 90 sec. Spatio-temporal signatures of brain oscillations were analyzed using Morlet wavelet transform followed by exploratory parallel-factor analysis. A consistent reduction in beta power (15–25 Hz) was found over the parieto-occipital and centro-temporal electrode regions on all four conditions—(a) correct (vs. incorrect) solutions, (b) solutions without (vs. with) external hint, (c) successful (vs. unsuccessful) utilization of the external hint, and d) self-reported high (vs. low) insight. Gamma band (30–70 Hz) power was increased in right fronto-central and frontal electrode regions for conditions (a) and (c). The effects occurred several (up to 8) seconds before the behavioral response. Our findings indicate that insight is represented by distinct spectral, spatial, and temporal patterns of neural activity related to presolution cognitive processes that are intrinsic to the problem itself but not exclusively to one's subjective assessment of insight